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FRANCHISING AS A SECURITY
'When purchasing a franchise for the exclusive right to market the cor-
respondence courses of Continental Schools of America (CSA) in the
Dallas-Fort Worth and Houston areas, James McPeek and Venture In-
vestment Co. had relied on CSA's representations that
1. CSA had been in business since 1959;
2. CSA wrote up $8,000 to $10,000 worth of busine3s per month in an
area the size of each of... [the franchisee's] . . . proposed areas;
3. That the CSA courses were licensed by the Colorado State Board of
Education as being "par excellence;"
4. That CSA was comprised of a team of experienced personnel who
had been successful businessmen prior to joining CSA; and
5. That [CSA] would personally secure the first twenty enrollments.'
Each of these representations was false. McPeek and Venture Invest-
ment sued CSA in federal court2 for damages caused by "defendant's
fraud, breach of contract, unlawful sale of securities and fraud in connec-
tion with the sale of securities."3 Recovery was sought under the Colo-
rado Securities Act,4 and the Securities Act of 19335 and Securities Exchange
Act of 19346 on the theory that the franchises were investment contracts
within the definition of a security.7 The district court held that CSA had
sold the plaintiffs investment contracts as defined in the Colorado statute.
Venture Investment Co. v. SchaeferO is the first federal case which holds
a franchise to be a security on the basis of either dhe "risk capital" or
"control" test for an investment contract.9
The new attitude of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
toward the regulation of certain forms of franchises under the '33 and '34
Acts undoubtedly influenced the outcome in Venture Investment."0 In
fact, the district court borrowed much of its reasoning directly from 1933
Act Release No. 5211, in which the SEC declared certain multi-level dis-
IVenture Investment v. Schaefer, 3 BLUE SKY L REP. 5 71,031 (D. Colo. July 24, 1972).
2 Jurisdiction was based on diversity and federal questions arising under the Securities Acts
of 1933 and 1934 and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
3 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 71,031 at 67,232.
4 Colorado Licensing and Practice Act, CoLo. REV. STAT. ANt. §§ 125-1-12, 125-1-21
(1963).
5 15 U.S.C. §§ 77c-77bbbb (1970).
615 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. § 77(b) (1) (1970); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 125-1-12 (1963); "Security"
under both the federal and state acts means "any note . . . certificate of participation in any
profit-sharing agreement... investment contract ... or, in general, any interest or instrument
commonly known as a 'security.'" 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970.
8 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. 71,031 (D. Colo. July 24, 1972).
9 Both of these tests will be discussed in detail later.
10 Since "security" is defined to include "investment contract" under both the federal and
state securities acts, it is safe to assume that the rationale of the decision would apply in the same
way to a daim brought solely under the federal acts.
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tributorship and pyramid franchise plans to be securities.1 Although there
is evidence that not all federal courts will follow the lead of Venture In-
vestment in applying the rationale of Release No. 5211 for the benefit of
franchisees presently seeking remedies against fraudulent franchisors un-
der the Securities Act, the decision represents a significant breakthrough."
It is the purpose of this discussion to study the circumstances in which
remedies should be available to franchisees under the federal securities
acts and to consider various proposals for federal franchise disclosure legis-
lation.
I. THE PROBLEM-AND OTHER ATTE PTS AT REMEDIES
The facts of Venture Investment paint a familiar picture. Along with
the boom in franchising over the past ten years"3 have come frequent
abuses.14 One of the most prevalent abuses is misrepresentation in the sale
of the franchise. In many cases, the initial sale produces the bulk of the
profit by the franchisor, and so there is an incentive for the franchisor to
11 Securities Act of 1933 Release No. 5211, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No.
9387 (both issued November 30, 1971) [hereinafter referred to as Release]. The Commission
adopted a more liberal test for an "investment contract" than the traditional How test, stating
that if the investor does not control his investment to a significant degree, a security exists.
S.E.C. Chairman William J. Casey recently called on Congress to darify the authority of
the Securities and Exchange Commission over pyramid plans. Recently, the S.E.C. attempted
to apply existing securities laws to the pyramid-selling operations of Glenn W. Turner Enter-
prises, Inc. in Portland, Oregon. The federal district court did grant the S.E.C. a preliminary
injunction against further sales of "Dare To Be Great" motivational and self.improvement
courses, but the S.E.C. was denied its request for a receiver and for repayment of money to "Dare
To Be Greae participants. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., CCH FED. SrC. L REP.
593,605 (May 25, 1972). The case is on appeal. Thus, Mr. Casey stated that the case cannot
be relied on to establish S.E.C. authority over the pyramid sales plans. Wall Street Journal,
Sept. 12, 1972, at 6 col. 1.
13 
"In its broadest sense, the franchise system now accounts for 80 billion dollars in annual
sales, or 10% of the Gross National Product, and more than 205o of all retail sales, with well
over 700 franchisors and as many as 500,000 franchisees." H. BROWN, FRANCHISING: TRAP
FOR THE TRusTING 2 (1969) [hereinafter cited as TRAP]. See also the Rcport of the Scect
Committee on Small Business on the Impact of Franchising on Small Business S. REP. No. 91-
1344, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Report]. The Select Committee on
Small Business found as follows:
Franchising is quite often regarded as one of the "neweste marketing concepts on the
American business scene. Actually, the franchising concept has been utilized success-
fully by American businessmen for over 70 years. General Motors adopted franchis-
ing in 1898, followed by Rexall in 1902. What is truly new about franchising
is the recent phenomenal growth of franchised businesses in all areas of marketing.
Approximately 90 percent of the franchise companies now in operation have started
since 1954.
New franchisees are coming into the system at the rate of approximately 40,000
per year. During the past 5 years, the number of companies offering franchises has
more than tripled.
1970 Report at 7.
1 Three major abuses have arisen: (1) dishonest franchisors have used misrepresentations
and half-truths to sell the franchise; (2) after completion of the sale, some franchisors have
failed to deliver the franchised business ready for operation within a reasonable time; (3)
some franchisors have unreasonably terminated the franchise. Augustine and Hruoff, Franchioe
Regulation, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 1347, 1365 (1970).
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paint a glowing picture for the franchisee in order to secure the sale.15
The franchisor can then afford to be relatively unconcerned about whether
or not the franchisee has gross sales sufficient to continually order prod.
ucts from the franchisor or to pay royalties, which do not substantially in-
crease the profits of the franchisee. The franchisee, after having been in-
duced to invest by the glowing profit pictures painted by the franchisor,
often finds that he has lost his investment.
Remedies under state law are often inadequate to meet the problem of
fraud in the sale of franchises. 6 For example, a franchisee seeking rescis-
sion of the franchise contract 17 has to prove that when purchasing the fran-
chise he relied upon the franchisor's misrepresentation of a material fact.
Although the franchisee need not prove scienter, he does need to over-
come the materiality problem.' The distinction between a statement of
"fact" and mere opinion or "puffing" is also critical to the franchisee's
case.
19
If the franchisee brings an action in deceit, he then meets two formi-
dable obstacles to proof: (1) Scienter and causation, and (4) materiality
and reliance." In a common law breach of warranty action,2' the fran-
chisee faces all the intricacies of the parol evidence rule,'2 and if success-
ful, he often finds the franchisor to be insolvent. In sum, the state
common law remedies are complicated and inadequate and often, the fran-
chisee will find himself without relief.23
On the federal level, remedies are equally unsatisfactory. Franchisors
who use fraudulent representations to secure a sale and who use an instru-
ment of interstate commerce to complete the sale are subject to prosecution
for mail fraud 4 and to action by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
for unlawful "deceptive acts or practices in commerce,"a& but the individual
15 Augustine and Hrusoff, Franchising Under the Securities Acts of 1933 and the California
Corporation Code, 44 L.A. BULI. BAR 555, 576 (1969).
16 The fraud problem in the sale of franchises has been dealt with through specific legisla-
tion in some states.
17Either affirmatively or a defense to a breach of contract action brought by the franchlsor.
Is 37 AM. JJ. 2d Fraud and Deceit § 12 (1968).
'i Id.
20 Id.
21 A breach of warranty action under the Uniform Commercial Code may not be available
because the sale of a franchise does not fit readily into the Code's definition of a "sale." It is
a licensing agreement, rather than a transaction in goods. See UNIVORM COMSRCIAL CODD
§§ 2-105, 2-106 (1962 version).
22 Franchise contracts are commonly in writing. Therefore, the franchisee may not be able
to introduce evidence of oral misrepresentation unless he can show that the writing was not an
integration of the agreement.
23The problems discussed in reference to recovery under the common law for injuries suf-
fered as a result of fraud are general and by no means limited to the franchise situation.
24 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1970).
25 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
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plaintiff is not given any right of action under the FTC Act. - G Rather, the
FTC sues in the name of the United States to halt the practice.
The franchisee seeking damages for the loss of his investment under
state common law remedies or under the FTC Act will find the road to
money recovery a rocky one.
II. FRANCHISEES TURN TO THE SECURITIES LAWS
Because recovery under various state and federal laws is so difficult,
franchisees who have been duped by fraudulent franchisors have begun to
seek relief28 under state and federal securities laws.
The initial hurdle faced by the franchisee seeking recovery under the
securities laws is the necessary showing that the franchise which he pur-
chased is a security. This is a formidable problem, but assuming he can
overcome this burden, his road to recovery under the securities laws is free
of the intricacies of pleading and proof present in other actions.
To state a cause of action under § 12(1) of the Securities Act a plain-
tiff need only show:
1. that the franchisor was a seller, or under § 15, a person in control of
a seller;
2. that the mails or some means of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce was used in connection with the offer or sale of
the security to the particular purchaser;
3. that the seller failed to comply with either the registration or prospec-
tus requirements;
4. that plaintiff is bringing the action within the statute of limitations;
5. if plaintiff is seeking rescission, that he properly tendered the security
to the seller."
Besides the fact that all of these elements are simple for the franchisee to
show, 0 the defendant's only defense is to show that the transaction was
exempt from registration under § 5.31
26 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1970). A successful FTC action can be used as a predicate for a
private suit. However, the FI*C does not bring suit in all cases in which they have received a
complaint from a victim of an "unfair or deceptive trade practice." Thus, the injured party
may find himself awaiting FTC action which may never be taken.
27 Id. § 45.
2 8 Civil liability was often the only effective remedy under state blue-sky laws. Criminal
prosecutions were rare because of inadequate budgets. L Loss, SECURIES REGULATIO, 1631
(1961).
29 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
3 0 The simplicity of § 12(1) is paralleled in many state securities acts. It is likely that the
franchisor did make use of the mails in dealing with the franchisee; it is unlikely that the fran.
chisor registered his "franchise-security" before he offered it for sale.
31 The defense most often used was to resist the contentioa that the franchise was a security
and thus show that the transaction was not subject to the Act.
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III. THE INVESTMENT CONTRACT AND THE COURTS
As pointed out above, the threshhold problem faced by a franchisee
seeking recovery under the securities laws is the characterization of his
franchise as a security. Franchisees have most often argued that the fran-
chise contract was actually an "investment contract" within the definition
of a security32 as formulated in SEC v. W. 1. Howey Co.,3" i.e. (1) there
must be a common enterprise, and (2) the investor must expect to derive
his profits solely from the efforts of others.3 4 The second element of this
test has proved to be the major stumbling block for many franchises. The
district court in Drug Management, Inc. v. Dart Drug Corp. 5 rendered an
interpretation of the "profits derived solely from the efforts of others"
test which is characteristic of the strict interpretation given the IHowey
test by many state and federal cours.
Dart Drug, unlike Howey, involved a franchise contract a'0 in which the
franchisor had agreed to provide the franchisee with an exclusive fran-
chise for drug stores in the Charlotte, North Carolina area. The district
court found that the franchise contract did not constitute an investment
contract because the franchisee performed some duties. It did not, how-
ever, consider whether these were managerial or ministerial duties, nor
did it consider the possibility that the Howey test may not have been the
only test for an investment contract. Under Dart Drug, a franchisee who
performed only ministerial duties, appearing to be more like an employee
than an independent businessman, might still be characterized as having
"control" over his franchise.
It was at the state level that the harshness of Dart Drug was first soft-
ened. In 1967, Anthony Pierno, Attorney General of California, wrote
an opinion making it clear that the California Corporation Commission
would consider a franchise to be a security in two situations:
(1) Where the franchisee participates only nominally in the franchised
business; or (2) where the franchisee participates actively in the franchised
business and where the franchisor agrees to provide certain goods and ser-
vices to the franchisee, but where the franchisor intends to secure a sub-
stantial portion of the initial capital that is needed to provide such goods
and services from the fees paid by the franchisee or franchisees.37
After formulation of this test, California franchisees, who were able
to show that they performed no important managerial functions in the
32 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
3 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
34 Id. at 298-99.
3 5 CCH Fm. SEc L REp. 5 91,293 (D.D.C. 1963) [hereinafter cited as Dart Drug].
30 One author argues that Dart Drug did not involve a franchise agreement, but rather in-
volved a sale of data concerning the operation of a drug store. Sc, Goodwin, Franchising in tho
Economy: The Franchise Agreement as a Security undcr Securitis Acts, Including lob-5 Con-
siderations, 24 Bus. LAW. 1311 (1969).
3749 Ops. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 124 (1967).
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operation of the franchise or who could demonstrate that the franchisor
used part of the franchise fee to provide capital for the franchisor's busi-
ness,38 could afford themselves of remedies resulting from the franchisor's
failure to register the "security-franchise." 3"
The California test is a two-pronged attack on the definitional diffi-
culties in finding a franchise to be a security.40 First, California adopted
the "risk capital" test, which at least one legal scholar had proposed as
the most essential indication of a security."1 Second, California adopted a
liberal interpretation of the Howey test. No longer would mere minis-
terial control be regarded as the kind of control which would indicate that
profits were not "derived solely from the efforts of others." It was enough
that either the "risk capital" test or the "control" test be satisfied to find
a franchise to be an investment contract.
IV. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
Soon after formulation of the California test, franchisees began to
urge its adoption by the federal courts in actions brought under the Secu-
rities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The first case,
Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co.,42 involved a franchise distributor-
ship agreement. After failure of the distributorship, Chapman sued Rudd
for selling an unregistered security under Section 12(1) of the Securities
Act of 1933, arguing that he did not exercise managerial control over his
investment and therefore did derive profits "solely from the efforts of
others." The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the distributorship
agreement did not provide that Chapman was to obtain profits solely from
the efforts of others, and that the brochure sent to Chapman during the
bargaining stage did not lead him to expect profits derived solely from the
efforts of others.43 Consequently, the distributorship agreement was held
not to be an investment contract.
38 If the franchisee could demonstrate that the franchise fee was disproportionate to the
value of the franchisor's license and the goods and services franchisor could provide, the fran-
chisee had a good argument that part of the fee was being used to capitalize the franchisor's
business.
3 9 CAL. CoRp. CODE § 25500 (West Supp. 1971).
40The sale of securities in California is regulated through the issuance of permits:
No company shall sell any security of its own issue, except upon a sale for a delinquent
assessment against the security made in accordance with the laws of this State, or
offer for sale, negotiate for the sale of, or take subscriptions for any such security,
until it first applied for and secured from the commissioner a permit authorizing it
to do so.
CAL. CoRP. CODE § 25500 (West Supp. 1971).
41 See Coffey, Economic Realities of a Security, 18 W. RES. L. REV. 367, 374 (1967). It
is Mr. Coffey's contention that the Howey test is "incomplete or misleading with respect to
certain essential qualities of a security." He argues that the Howey test ignores the risk of loss
to the original value furnished by the purchaser and that this risk to original value is the single
most important characteristic of a security.
42 409 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1969).
43 The brochure sent to the plaintiff is pertinent because the Securities Act of 1933 prohibits
1972]
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Although plaintiff urged a more liberal interpretation of the Hou'ey
control test,44 the court of appeals retained the strict Dart Drag interpreta-
tion, thereby illustrating that the federal courts would ignore the progres-
sive approach taken in California for some time to come. Such a view
meant that franchise agreements could qualify as securities only in these
rare cases when the franchisee performed no function whatever in the
operation of the franchise.
But the California test was not ignored by the federal courts for long.
The first federal case to give full consideration to the California test was
Mr. Steak, Inc. v. River City Steak, Inc.4" The facts of River City are
worthy of close consideration. Mr. Steak sold to River City Steak a fran-
chised restaurant operation for an initial investment of $35,000, with fur-
ther payments to be based upon a percentage of the weekly gross sales of
the restaurant. The franchise agreement required River City Steak to exe-
cute a "restaurant manager's agreement" with one Zenck, who had been
recruited and trained by Mr. Steak. Mr. Steak was to be responsible for
constructing and equipping the establishment and training the manager;
River City was to carry insurance, maintain trade secrets, submit to inspec-
tions, and appoint an agent to accept process. River City also agreed not
to compete with Mr. Steak and to use certain uniforms and certain fran-
chisor products exclusively. River City was to give Mr. Steak exclusive
right to train a manager, to spend specific sums on advertising, and was to
allow Mr. Steak to participate in the initial hiring and opening of the
restaurant.
40
The court viewed these provisions as necessary for Mr. Steak to main-
tain "uniformly high standards to promote its own continued growth, '" 41
although it admitted that these are not ordinarily found in other business
contracts. The court further found these provisions to be consistent with
a finding of managerial control by River City.
The agreement further provided that either the franchisee or the fran-
the offer as well as the sale of unregistered non-exempt securities. Tho court of appeals found
that the brochure emphasized the minimal amount of effort that the franchisee would have to
make in order to derive profits. In addition, the brochure contained profit projections supposedly
based on market tests. It repeatedly emphasized the profit-making efforts of Rudd in the dis.
tributorship plan and described the distributorship as a turn-key operation into which the in.
vestor may step, "whereupon he is immediately involved in... a sabstantial and profitable un-
dertaking with a minimum obligation on his time and resources."
The court found that the very fact that the brochure emphasized the amount of assistance the
company would provide implied that the franchisee was to make some Cjort, Because the
brochure contained no financial data on Rudd, or any balance sheet figures or past earnings
record, the court found that the brochure was not a prospectus.
44 The plaintiff urged the court to apply the California view of die Howey test. Under this
view, Chapman would have to exercise real managerial control over the distributorship in order
for the franchise to be found not to be an "investment contract." The Court did not consider
the California risk capital test in deciding the case.
45 324 F. Supp. 640 (D. Colo. 1970).




chisor, if the former failed to act, could select the manager. However,
Mr. Steak selected Mr. Zenck as manager without consulting River City.
The franchise agreement further specified that the manager was to operate
the restaurant as a "sanitary, efficient and high quality Mr. Steak restau-
rant,"4 s as defined by Mr. Steak's directives. The agreement specified the
manager's salary and required him to invest in the franchisee's stock. (in
this case, Mr. Zenck invested $5,000 in River City Steak stock, but was re-
quired to assign his stock to Mr. Steak.) 4 The manager was to be the only
person who actively managed the franchise; and if he did not comply with
the orders of Mr. Steak, which according to the agreement had "the power
to supervise, instruct, and direct the activities, duties and functions of the
Investor-Manager,""0 he could be removed at the absolute discretion of Mr.
Steak. If Mr. Steak chose to fire the manager, River City Steak had no
voice in appointing a new manager.
The court stated that these provisions seemed to afford actual control
of the restaurant to Mr. Steak, but found further language in the agree-
ment which required the manager to operate the restaurant in "an honest
and upright manner,"5' 1 according to specifications set up by the franchisee
as well as the franchisor. The franchisee also had the right to terminate
the manager's employment upon two weeks' written notice to Mr. Steak
and the manager.
The court saw these two factors as important evidence that the mana-
ger retained some managerial control over the enterprise, but was troubled
by other facts which demonstrated that River City abdicated control over
its financial affairs. In order to secure the franchise, River City was re-
quired to give Mr. Steak the power to pay all salaries and accounts payable
from its bank accounts and to give Mr. Steak weekly franchise fees and
meat counts, invoices, tickets for items purchased, records of cash received
and deposited, duplicate bank deposit slips, duplicate cash register slips,
and receipts for items paid for in cash by the franchisee. In addition, the
franchisee's bank sent all account statements and daily deposit verification
slips directly to Mr. Steak. On the basis of these requirements the district
court found that
[tjhe practical consequence .. .was to afford Mr. Steak an effective
control system over the franchisee's receipts and operations. The cost to
the francisee... [was] loss of control over some phases of the finan-
cial operations although his business judgment need not be otherwise im-
paired.52
481d.
49 If Zenck's employment were terminated, he would receive a like amount or the actual
value of his stock whichever were greater.
0 324 F. Supp. at 643.
5l Id.
52 Id. at 643-44 (emphasis added).
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But the district court further found that the franchise agreement and the
manager's agreement contemplated that River City would "play an active,
if severely circumscribed role, in the conduct of the restaurant," 3 and thus
the district court held that River City did exercise managerial control over
its investment.
The court then considered the facts under the "risk capital" test and
concluded that the California test was "too extreme. ' 4  In the court's
judgment, a better view of the risk capital test would limit application of
the 1933 Act to "situations where exceptionally high risk, speculative fran-
chises are involved," ' but since Mr. Steak had over 200 successful fran-
chises in operation, it was not shown to be poorly financed or highly specu-
lative. Neither was River City solely dependent on Mr. Steak for supplies:
Defendant [River City] assured itself a supply of necessary food products
independently of Mr. Steak, which specified product,, available from sup-
pliers other than itself, that were to be used in restaurant operations.
Given the initial costs, including construction, incident to opening the res-
taurant, and excluding accounting services of dubioas value supplied by
Mr. Steak, we think it fair to conclude that River City Steak, Inc.'s, in-
vestment in plaintiff's business comprised the purchase of the Mr. Steak
name and method of doing business. Any "risk" to River City Steak cre-
ated by that purchase is an insubstantial and legitimate risk of doing busi-
ness.
5 6
Having found that River City controlled its investment in the franchise and
that the risk capital test was inapplicable, the court held that no invest-
ment contract had been sold under the facts of the case.
The decision ultimately rested on the court's finding that River City
controlled its franchise, but the district court took an extreme view of what
constituted real managerial control over a business. The court placed great
emphasis on the franchisee's power to fire the manager who had been hired
and trained by Mr. Steak, but that power should be considered in conjunc-
tion with the fact that if the manager were fired, River City would have
had no voice in the hiring of a new manager. Whyle it was true that the
manager was to run the restaurant according to the directives of the fran-
chisee as well as the franchisor, it was also true that River City surrendered
all power "to supervise, instruct, and direct the activities, duties and func-
tions of the Investor-Manager," 57 and that the manager was given the "sole
right to manage and control the daily operation and affairs of the Mr.
Steak restaurant." Presumably, if the directives of the franchisee and the
53Id. at 645. The district court applied the "better approach and the one which the Supreme
Court in Howey noted was being employed by the state courts ... to disregard form for sub-







franchisor conflicted, Mr. Steak would have prevailed for this reason. In
practice, the provisions on which the court relied to find some managerial
control in the hands of the franchisee were overridden by conflicting pro-
visions giving control to the franchisor, and, therefore, the apparent con-
trol in the hands of the franchisee was a nullity.
The court, strongly influenced by the then current view that the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission should not involve itself in the franchise
problem,58 readily accepted evidence of the slightest measure of control by
River City as evidence of managerial control:
Our conclusion is supported by weighty considerations. The registra-
tion provisions of the 1933 Act are ill-suited to fostering disclosure of
information relevant to prospective franchisees.... In view of the Com-
mission's position, the complex problems involved and the impact of this
industry on our national economy we agree that judicial imposition of the
1933 Act upon the sale of franchised businesses may be inappropriate.
Such a step should properly be taken by the Congress or state legisla-
tures.59
The court's findings that River City had assured itself a supply of neces-
sary food products independent of Mr. Steak and that the franchise fee
was proportionate to the value of Mr. Steak's method of doing business
were perhaps the most influential in determining the outcome of the case.
The court concluded from these facts that even if Mr. Steak failed, the
franchisee was in a position to carry on business without losing his invest-
ment, particularly since he did have some skill in the restaurant business.
The court distinguished this from the situation in which failure of the
franchisor's business results in certain failure for the franchisee.co
The district court is probably correct in its conclusion that where the
58 "If disclosure is to be obtained in the franchising area, this should be by the enactment
of separate legislation rather than ... simply changing the definition of security in the Securities
Act so as to make a franchise a security thereunder." Statement of Philip A. Loomis, Jr. Gen-
eral Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission, in Hearings on the Impact of Franchising
on Small Business Before the Subcommittee on Urban and Rural Economic Derelopment of the
Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, S. REP. No. 91-1344, 91st Con&, 2d Sess. 706 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings].
Further evidence of the extent to which this district court was influenced by the opinion of
the Securities and Exchange Commission is the fact that the district court which decided River
City also decided Venture Investment. But Venture Investmcnt was decided after the Securities
and Exchange Commission changed its position on certain franchising plans in Release No. 5211.
59324 F. Supp. at 647.
60 The court made much of the fact that investors in Howc.y were out-of-state investors who
knew nothing about the citrus-growing business. Therefore, they had to rely on the skill of the
Howey-in-the-Hills Co., for a return on their investment. In River City, however, the franchisee
had some previous experience in the restaurant business. This indicated to the court that River
City could have controlled the franchise if it had wished, but the court is confused on this issue.
While it may have been possible for River City to salvage some of its investment if Mr. Steak
had failed, it was not possible under the franchise contract, as it existed, for River City to put
to use any of its managerial skills. In order to secure the franchise, River City was forced to
rely on Mr. Steak's skills for any return on its investment.
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failure of the franchisor results in certain failure for the franchisee,"1 the
franchisee cannot be said to have control over his investment."' How-
ever, the converse of this assertion may not be true, for even though the
failure of the franchisor does not portend certain failure for the franchisee,
it does not necessarily follow that the franchisee has real managerial con-
trol over his franchise. In the facts of River City, for example, the fran-
chisee may well have been able to salvage part of his investment if Mr.
Steak failed (although Mr. Steak was evidently not a candidate for busi-
ness failure). The relevant question should be whether the franchisee
maintained discretion over his investment, regardless of whether the fran-
chisor operated a healthy business. Because the franchisee exercised so
little control over the business, it appeared that River City had, in exchange
for a return on its investment, simply financed a new outlet for Mr. Steak.
The amount of return depended on how well Mr. Steak and its manager
ran the restaurant, not on the managerial efforts of River City.
V. CHANGE IN THE COMMISSION'S VIEW
The view given the control aspect of the California test in River City
did not, however, serve to re-entrench an exacting interpretation of the
control test in the state courts. Hawaii followed C-lifornia's lead in de-
veloping a more progressive approach to the franchise investment contract
problem. In Hawaii v. Hawaii Market Center, Inc.,6 the Hawaii supreme
court dealt with a pyramid distributorship plan and formulated a test dif-
ferent from California's. Under the Hawaii test, a franchise is an invest-
ment contract when
(1) an offeree furnishes value to an offeror, and
(2) a portion of this initial value is subjected to the risks of the enter-
prise, and
(3) the furnishing of the initial value is induced by the offeror's prom-
ises or representations which give rise to a reasonable understanding
that a valuable benefit of some kind, over and above the initial
value, will accrue to the offeree as a result of the operation of the
enterprise, and
(4) the offeree does not receive the right to exercise practical and actual
control over the managerial decisions of the enterprise.64
The Hawaii test differs from the California test in that the franchisee
must show both lack of managerial control and subjection of the franchise
6l As in a distributorship agreement where the franchise fee has ,cen used to capitalize the
franchisor.
62 If presented with a fact pattern similar to Chapman, the Ricr Cily court would have
found an investment contract, ite., if presented with evidence that part of the franchisee fee had
been used to capitalize the franchisor's business.
63485 P.2d 105 (Hawaii 1971).
64 Id. at 109. Much of the Hawaii test is borrowed from the test proposed by Professor
Coffey. See Coffey, supra note 41.
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fee to the risks of the franchisor's business. Under this test, it is not
enough that the franchisee lacks control over his franchise, nor is it enough
that the franchisor is using the franchise fee to capitalize his own business.
Both conditions must exist before a franchisee can satisfy the definition of
investment contract under the Hawaii test.
It was this test that the Commission adopted when it cracked down on
pyramid franchising last year. The Commission's release modified the
former view that franchising should not be regulated under the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934."5 The more liberal
view taken by the Commission was as follows:
The term "security" must be defined in a manner adequate to serve the
purpose of protecting investors. The existence of a security must depend
in significant measure upon the degree of managerial authority over the
investor's funds retained or given, and performance by an investor of
duties related to the enterprise, even if financially significant and plainly
contributing to the success of the venture, may be irrelevant to the exis-
tence of a security if the investor does not control the use of his funds to
a significant degree. The "efforts of others" referred to in Howey are
limited, therefore, to those types of essential managerial efforts but for
which the anticipated return could not be produced.00
The release gave notice that the Commission will consider multi-level dis-
tributorships and pyramid sales plans to be securities (1) when the fran-
chisee does not exercise managerial control over his investment, and (2)
when the investment by the franchisee finds its way into the capital account
of the franchisor.6 7  It may also influence the federal courts to take a lib-
65 Release, supra note 11.
661d. at 33-5211. The Commission takes a view of the control test which conflicts with
the River City view. Realistically, it could not be said that River City performed those "types
of essential managerial efforts but for which the anticipated return could not be produced."
67 In the multi-level distributorship plan, the manufacturer represents that it intends to
manufacture or sell a product It then purports to offer franchises for distributing these prod-
ucts. For a relatively small fee, the purchaser is supplied with a sample inventory and he is
authorized to make sales to the public. For a larger fee, the franchisee receives a wholesale in-
ventory which he supervises. For an even larger fee, he may purchase the right to be the
"link" between the manufacturer and the rest of the distributorship chain
In the pyramid sales plan, funds are solicited from a certain number of "founders" to con-
struct a retail store that is owned and operated by the promoters of the plan. The "founders"
are given an identification card which they are to pass along to prospective customers of the
store When the store opens, these cards are presented upon making a purchase and the "founder"
will receive a commission on that sale. For other cases dealing with multi.level distributorships
and pyramid sales plans see Frye v. Taylor, No. 70-952 (FL C. App. March 9, 1972) (a piramid
franchise for the sale of cosmetics was found to be an "interest in or under a profit-sharing or
participation agreement or scheme); Shaul v. Consumer Companies of America, Inc., No.
72CV-03-824 (C.P. Franklin County, Ohio, March 28, 1972) (representative contracts in a
merchandising plan entitling investors to receive commissions for sales and for recruitment of
other representatives are investment contracts which are securities under the blue sky provisions
of the Ohio Code); Oklahoma v. World Trade Markets Centers, Inc., CJ-72-1575 (Dist. Cr.
Okla. City June 2, 1972) (sale of dealer and key dealer contracts was equivalent to a sale of
securities in that investors were asked to contribute capital for a venture in which they had no
right of control).
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eral view of what constitutes an investment contract.08 Since the district
court which heard River City is the same court which decided Venture In-
vestment, it may be safely assumed that the Commission's change in atti-
tude prompted the change in that outlook. 9
Venture Investment is the first federal case to hold that a franchise is
an investment contract on the basis of the SEC-Hawaii test. The district
court specifically found that both parts of the text had been satisfied un-
der the facts of the case. First, the franchise fee had been used as capital
"for the very basic elements of setting up the franchise system of opera-
tion as a whole, ' '70 and second, the franchisee had no control over the es-
sential managerial aspects of the correspondence school business.
The finding on the control issue causes some confusion since it appears
from the facts of the case that the franchisees were given complete control
over the manner in which they chose to sell the franchisor's courses. In
Venture Investment the undercapitalization of the franchisor determined
the finding on the control issue. Once the franchisee's investment found
its way into the franchisor's capital account, it was thereafter impossible
for the franchisees to exercise real control over their investments, short of
making management decisions in the franchisor's business. The court
was therefore correct in its conclusion that the franchisees had no mana-
gerial control over their franchises.
The change in attitude of the Commission may explain to a large de-
gree the different results in Venture Investment and River City, but per-
haps an even more important influence on the courts was the increased risk
to the franchisee when the franchisor was inadequately capitalized. In
River City, the franchisor had other franchises operating smoothly and had
thereby demonstrated that it could live up to its part of the bargain. Had
the franchisee held complete managerial control, he would have run only
the risk of failure that is attendant to the operation of any business. This
is to be distinguished from the situation in Venture Investment where the
68 The federal courts may ignore a release of the Securities and Exchange Commission be-
cause it does not have the force of law that a rule or regulation has. See L. Loss, SECURITIMS
REGULATION 1894 (1961). But usually the courts give "controlling" weight to Commission
interpretations. Id. at 1930. The River City decision has been affirmed by the Court of Ap-
peals for the 10th Circuit. This does not indicate that the court of appeals has ignored the
release since River City did not involve a pyramid franchise plan. Indeed, the control issue in
Venture Investment and River City are substantially different. It does, however, indicate that
there will be no great willingness, at least in the 10th Circuit, to read the release broadly. The
Commission may have thrown out the release to see if the courts would accept it. The Com-
mission has received some negative feedback and is now requesting legislation from Congress
to clarify the Commission's authority over pyramid franchising. See note 11 supra.
609 The true test of how the federal courts will receive the change in attitude of the Com-
mission will come if Venture Investment goes up on appeal. If the case is affirmed, the Com-
mission will have a strong precedent on its side confirming its authority over pyramid franchis-
ing. The River City affirmance may stand as precedent that the court will not accept further
extension of the Commission's authority over franchising without Congressional action on the
matter.
703 BLUE SKY L. REP. 5 71,031 at 67,233 (1972).
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franchisor was not adequately capitalized, having no other franchise out-
lets to demonstrate that it could deliver correspondence courses, the prod-
uct of the franchise business, even if McPeek and Venture Investment made
sales. Thus even if a highly ambitious franchisee did prove to be a suc-
cessful salesman, there was no guarantee that his business would succeed.
This problem of the franchisor's capitalization is inextricably related
to the control issue, since if the franchisor is inadequately capitalized, he
will almost invariably use the franchise fee to finance his own operations,
thereby taking control of the investment away from the franchisee. This
was the case in Venture Investment where the franchisee admittedly could
regulate the method of sale and could perform other managerial functions.
In River City, even though most of the managerial control was retained
by the franchisor, the entire investment (or at least a significant portion of
'it) went toward the individual operation of the franchisee.
The crucial difference, then, between River City and Venture Invest-
ment is in the amount of control exercised by the franchisee over his own
investment. In River City, the franchisee appeared to have little control
over the franchise business, but at least his investment went toward financ-
ing his own outlet. In Venture Investment, the franchisee appeared to have
complete discretion over the franchise business, but because of the under-
capitalization of the franchisor, most of the investment had been taken by
the franchisor to finance his own operations.7 1  It was the failure of the
franchisor over which the plaintiff in Venture Investment had no control,
and his risks were significantly different for that reason. The emphasis
placed on the risk capital aspect in these cases leads one to believe that the
71 Even before the Release and Venture Investment, potential franchisors were being advised
to keep the franchise fee separate from their capital account so that it could not be said that any
part of the franchise fee was risk capital and to calculate carefully the exact cost of the franchise
so as to avoid the accusation that the cost was disproportionate to the amount of goods and ser-
vices the franchisor could ever hope to provide:
The test appears to revolve around the purpose of the sale of the franchise and the
use of the fee itself. If, in fact, the selling of the franchises is more important to the
company as a means of raising capital than the obvious purpose of expanding its
market penetration, there arises at least a superficial argument that the franchise in-
come is not income but capital contributions. This interpretation supports the con-
tention that it is not the franchises that are being sold, but the stock of the franchise
company.
C. ROSENFIELD, TiE LAW OF FRANCMSING § 216 (1970). [hereinafter referred to as LAw
OF FRA_ CISING). Franchisors were also advised to take special care in wording their adver-
tisements and to be wary that if they offered that franchise on an absentee-ownership or manage-
meat fee bases, then their franchise offering may actually be viewed as a security.
In this circumstance, [absentee ownership] the franchise company, through the sale
of the franchise, is generating its own growth on the investment of the franchisee and
the purchase of the franchise is merely a funding to the company of an added outlet.
The return or income ;o be earned by the franchisee is really a return on investment.
The absence of active participation leaves only the money invested as the force gen-
erating the income. This combination of facts creates a "securdes" situation under
the definition of the Securities Act.
Id. § 213.
1972]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL3
courts may be likely to find a security in situations where only the risk
capital test is satisfied.
Since the release, only two trial courts 2 have faced the River City type
of control problem where there has been no evidence of undercapitaliza-
tion of the franchisor. Because of the special facts of the two cases, neither
sheds light on the question of what the federal courts might do if faced
with a franchise contract similar to the one in River City. However, the
loth Circuit Court of Appeals has since affirmed the decision in River City,
offering some evidence that the federal courts may not accept any further
broadening of the definition of investment contract to include situations
in which the franchisor is not using the franchise fee to capitalize his own
business.
It is worthwhile to examine the circumstances in which a franchisee
might come to a federal court in seeking relief under the federal securities
acts. There are four basic situations:
1. If the franchisee can show that the franchisor is undercapitalized
and that the franchisee, according to the franchise contract, or in practice,
has no real managerial control over his franchised business, his franchise
will be found to be a security. The undercapitalizatfon of the franchisor
raises the suspicion that the money invested by the franchisee has not only
purchased a franchise for the franchisee but also has financed the fran-
chisor's business. A franchise fee which is disproportionate to the value
of the licensing agreement and the value to the franchisee of the franchi-
sor's method of doing business will raise the same suspicion. These cir-
cumstances satisfy the Hawaii tet, and the federal courts will probably
follow the import of the Commission's release and apply the Hawaii test
even to situations where pyramid franchises are not involved.
2. If the franchisor is capitalized adequately, but the franchisee has
no real managerial control over the franchise, it is difficult to say what the
72 In Hubefman's v. Denny' Restaurant, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Cal. 1972), an
action based on the Security Exchange Act of 1934, there was no evidence that any part of the
plaintiff's purchase price for the franchise and related property served to finance the franchisor's
business. The contract between the parties provided that the plaintiff was to play no part what.
ever in the operation of the restaurant but was to derive her profits from a percentage of the
restaurant sales each month. The court applied the "profits derived solely from the efforts of
others test" and found that an investment contract existed. The court distinguished ILuborman
from River City on its facts, and indeed, the facts in Huberman would appear to satisfy the
strictest rendition of the Howey test.
On July 25, 1972, Beefy Trail, Inc. v. Beefy King International, Ine., CCH FED. SEC. L. RiP
5 93,603 (M.D. Fla. July 25, 1972) was decided. Again, there ws a risk capital problem
in the case. The court found that the franchisee was an experienced businessman, who handled
the day-to-day operations of the restaurant and made managerial deisions. The court found
that the franchise was not an investment contract. Even under a liberal view of the Howy
test, this franchise would probably not qualify as an investment contract. The role of the fran-
chisor was not great in the daily operation of the franchise, and there was no capitalization
problem.
73CCH FED. SEC. L RiP. 5 93,476 (10th Cir. 1972). The couit of appeals did not shed
any new light on the decision in the lower court. It simply adopted its reasoning and affirmed.
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courts may do. This is essentially the River City situation and River City,
as stated above, was affirmed by the 10th Circuit after the Commission's
release.7  However, other circuits may either choose not to follow the
River City version of the control test in light of the Commission's release
or they may distinguish future cases on their facts. Some courts may find
that the franchisee is simply a passive investor who has financed an outlet
for the franchisor, with the investor's return coming solely from the efforts
of the franchisor.75 This would be satisfaction of the liberal Howey test
but there is no assurance that the courts will take this route without clari-
fication of the matter by the Commission or Congress.
3. The third situation is one in which the franchisor is shown to be
inadequately capitalized or where the franchise fee is disproportionate to
the amount of goods or services the franchisor can realistically provide,
but where the franchisee has complete discretion to operate his franchise
(essentially a Venture Investment situation). Following the lead of Ven-
ture Investment, the courts will find that the franchisee lacks control over
his business because the franchise fee is being used to capitalize the fran-
chisor's business. In this situation the riskiness of the franchisee's position
favors the application of the securities laws, for if the franchisor folds, the
franchisee's position is lost.70
4. The fourth situation has none of the securities qualities of the
others. That is the situation where the franchisor is adequately capital-
ized and where the franchisee has control over the franchised business.
The franchisee is paying for site-selection assistance, the established name,
the training, continuing management advice, and the cost of setting up the
physical plant of the business. In return, the franchisor has acquired a
new outlet for his inventory or services. This type of situation is not with-
in the scope of the '33 and '34 Acts under present definitions. The investor
has really invested in his own business and has been licensed to use the
franchisor's name and method of doing business. He has also purchased
other services from the franchisor, but has not been forced to relinquish
managerial control over his business. Everyone benefits from this arrange-
ment.77 It is doubtful that this plan could ever be brought within the fed-
74Id.
75 It is true that the franchisee may be able to salvage most of his investment if the fran-
chisor folds, assuming he has some knowledge of the business as the franchisee in River City.
However, many franchisees have no previous business experience in the field in which they
purchase a franchise.
76 The franchisee can never rescue that part of his investment which went down the drain
with the rest of the franchisor's "risk capital"
77 There are several reasons for the "boom" in franchising. First, in the expanding economy
of the 1960"s, the entrepreneur found himself without enough capital to tatisfy the increasing
demand for goods and services. The manufacturer, on the other hand did not have sufficient
capital both to accelerate production to supply existing outlets in the face of increasing market
demands and to establish new outlets in areas where a ready market awaited his product. The
solution to the dilemma was the popularization of a system which provided the manufacturer
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eral or state definition of a security without Congress enacting legislation
redefining the franchise as a security, but this does not mean that the other
forms of franchises cannot be regulated through the use of the federal or
state securities laws. Additionally, it does not follow from this conclusion
that the "ordinary" franchise need not be regulated, or that the "ordinary
franchisee investor" does not need the same kind of legislative protection
as franchisees who invest in more suspect types of franchises. Under the
present definition of a security, it is doubtful that the courts would accept
a redefinition of investment contract by the Commission in order to bring
all franchise situations within the securities laws. 78 Some franchise arrange-
ments simply do not satisfy the conception held by the courts of what
constitutes a security. Hopefully this type of franchise will be quickly
and effectively regulated without any Commission redefinition, which may
be struck down by the courts as beyond the scope of the Securities Act of
1933.79
VI. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
Even though the federal and state securities laws provide remedies to
franchisees in situations when the sale of the franchise constitutes a sale
of an investment contract, franchising still remains unregulated by any
single comprehensive piece of legislation. Some states have responded to
the need for regulation by redefining the franchise as a security in order
to bring it within the licensing provisions of their state blue sky laws. 0
Others have enacted a completely new disclosure law to handle the prob.
lem of fraud in the sale of franchises."' Two bills have been introduced
in Congress dealing with the problem of fraudulent sales of franchises
through the '33 and '34 Acts,"' two others have been introduced to deal
with new outlets without draining his capital and one which enabled the entrepreneur to exist
side-by-side with the giants: franchising. LAw OF FRANCHISING §§ 5.6.
7sThe Securities and Exchange Commission could attempt to redefine investment contract
by a rule, but the courts would probably hold such action to be beyond the scope of the meaning
intended by Congress.
[Tihe term investment contract had been used in many state blue sky laws prior to
the enactment of the federal securities laws and that its meaning as used in state laws
had been determined by state courts. [The Court in Howey] concluded that when
Congress introduced this term into the federal securities laws it intended it to have
the same meaning as had been previously developed under state law.
1970 Hearings at 707.
79 The Commission is not given a wholesale power to legislate under § 19 (a). The Com-
mission can only go so far in imposing new substantive requirements under the Act in the
guise of defining interpretative rules. See L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1942-43 (1961).
80 The Wisconsin Securities Commissioner classified franchises as securities in January 1970.
Wis. AD. RULES § 1.02(2) (1970).
81 California enacted the "Franchise Investment Law" CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516
(West Supp. 1971).
82S. 3844 was introduced on May 15, 1970 by Senator Harrison Williams, Jr. A com-
panion bill was introduced in the house by Mr. Stuckey, H.R. 1902, on August 13, 1970.
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with the problem through the FTC Act,ro others have been introduced to
deal with other aspects of the franchise relationship."'
To date, legislation introduced in Congress has attempted to handle the
fraud problem through disclosure rather than by setting out substantive
standards for franchises or practices. The purpose of the proposed bills
is, of course, to provide the franchisee with all the facts about the fran-
chisor before he buys the franchise. To this end, two of these bills attempt
to give the Securities and Exchange Commission authority over the fran-
chise problem. The most publicized of these, the "Franchise Full Disclo-
sure Act," was introduced into Congress by Senator Harrison Williams, Jr.
on August 15, 1970"S and requires prospective franchisors to disclose finan-
cial and other business data to the Commission for approval prior to any
sale of franchises. The bill further provides that the registration informa-
tion must be delivered to the prospective franchisee at least 48 hours prior
to the time he purchases, otherwise, the franchisee may later void the sale
at his discretion. Finally, the bill requires disclosure of any financial ar-
rangement the franchisor has made with any celebrity for the use of his
name in connection with the franchisor's business operation. Under this
proposed legislation, the franchisee would have a cause of action against
the franchisor for any false or misleading statement or misrepresentations
in making the sale. There are no substantive provisions dealing with
termination and buy-back procedures, though these must be explained fully
in the prospectus.
A similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives,"" differ-
ing from the Williams Bill only in that it preempts state laws on franchise
disclosure and limits the civil liability of the franchisor to the actual dam-
ages suffered by the franchisee.
Both of these bills evolved out of a comprehensive study of the prob-
lem of franchising.17  The advantage of both bills is, of course, that they
provide for pertinent information to be given to the franchisee before he
varying degrees of success. Senator Hart introduced "Fairness in Franchising Act" 'Which
attempted to supplement the antitrust laws "by providing for fair competitive practices in termi-
nation of franchise agreements." S. 1967,91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
83 Two new bills have been introduced in the last session of Congress by Senator Williams
and Senator Vance Hartke. The Williams Bill is called the "Franchise Fair Practices Act of
1971." S. 2399, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971). It is patterned after the disclosure bill which he
introduced in the 91st Congress, except S. 2899 provides for the FrC to administer the Act
rather than the S.E.C. Mr. Hartke's bill, the "Franchise Fair Practices Act of 1971," S. 2870,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., is patterned after the California Franchise Investment Law. Again, the
regulating body is to be the FTC.
8415 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1970).
85 S. 3844, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
8 6 HR. 1902, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1970).
87 See 1970 Hearings; See also 1970 Report. No further action was taken on this by the 91st
Congress.
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purchases the franchise, information that must bz given regardless of
whether the franchise constitutes a security or not. Thus enactment of
either bill would avoid the difficulty that courts seem to have had in fitting
the franchise contract within the definition of an investment contract.
Another advantage of the bills is that they provide for regulation by
the Securities and Exchange Commission, thereby avoiding the creation of
another bureaucracy. The bills are fashioned after the Securities Act, so
the Commission would have no difficulty in implementing the bill into ex-
isting procedures.
There are difficulties with the two bills, the most salient problem being
a political one, however. Because of a strong franchisor lobby neither
bill is likely to be passed in the near future. Hearings on the bills were
held, but the 91st Congress took no further action on either.88 Since both
bills were introduced into Congress in 1970, franchisees have already had
a long wait for some form of legislation to handle the fraud problem.
In California a disclosure bill, administered by the same agency which
administers the state's securities laws, has met with success. Prior to the
enactment of the "Franchise Investment Law," sales of franchises were
regulated only to the limited extent to which the Corporate Securities Law
of 1968 applied,"9 and the franchise problem in Cabhfornia reached alarm-
ing proportions because franchisors were failing to provide complete in-
formation regarding the franchisor-franchisee relationship, including the
prior business experience of the franchisor 0 The FIL, which went into
effect on January 1, 1971, requires full disclosure from all franchisors and
those who offer or sell franchises in California must register with the Com-
missioner of Corporations. It requires the franchisor to keep accurate rec-
ords and creates both civil and criminal penalties for fraudulent practices
and failure to register. Those who are exempt from registration are not
exempt from liability. In order to be entitled to an exemption, a fran-
chisor must have a $5,000,000 net worth and must have at least 25 fran-
chisees conducting business at all times preceding the offer or sale to a
particular franchisee or must have conducted the business which is the sub-
88 Lobbying against the Stuckey bill may come from quarters other than the franchisors,
It provides for preemption of any state legislation in the franchise area. Many would feel that
this would represent further encroachment on states' rights.
8949 Ops. CAL. A'rr'Y GEN. 124 (1967). Before enactment of the FIL, the Department
of Corporations estimated that only about six franchises were registered under the Attorney
General's opinion of the law. It was felt that the securities approach was inadequate and was
not intended to include the area of franchises. 1970 Report at 96.
90 "Every indicator available to the Commissioner of Corporations to the Attorney General
and other law enforcement agencies, and to other governmental agencies concerned with busi-
ness problems, points out that the problems in connection with th.! sale of franchises are ac-
celerating. Public confidence in the franchise industry should be maintained if it is to remain
a significant part of the economy and the maintenance of that confidence may require reason-
able and sensible legislation." A. Pierno, Franchise Regulation-The Need for a New Ap.
proach, 44 L.A. BAR BULL. 501 (1969).
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ject of the franchise continuously for five years preceding such offer or
sale. If the parent corporation meets these requirements then the fran-
chisor is exempt? 1
The exemptions exclude from registration those whose sales are out-
side the ambit of the "risk capital" test for a security since the fact that
the franchisor has an established track record indicates that it is probably
able to supply goods and services commensurate with the franchise fee.
It is further evidence that the franchisors probably are deriving profits
-from supplying goods and services to their franchisees rather than from
the initial sale of the franchise, and it is also unlikely that a company with
a net worth of $5,000,000 would seek risk capital through the sale of fran-
chises when traditional means would certainly be available. So, to a sig-
nificant extent, the FIL exempts from registration those who have been in
the-non-security classification under the old California Corporations Code. 2
The FIL is patterned after disclosure provisions in the California secu-
rities law and the administrative body is authorized to undertake remedial
action. The franchisor is required to disclose to the franchisee complete
information on fees and charges, termination and modification provisions,
and any obligations of the franchisee or sub-franchisee to purchase goods
from any outside sources designated by the franchisor. The law further
provides that a stop order may issue if after examination of the registra-
tion statement, the Commissioner finds that the offer or sale of the fran-
chise will constitute fraud or deceit upon the purchaser, that there has been
a failure to comply with any ruling which requires the impounding of the
franchise fees because of the inadequacy of financing by the franchisor,
or that there is involved in the sale any person who is subject to an order
by another administrative agency or who, therefore, has been convicted of
a felony and may create risks to the prospective franchisee. Notice of the
stop-order must be promptly given and a hearing must be held by the hear-
ing officer immediately.
The escrow provisions of the law are designed to help assure that the
franchisee who puts up money for a franchise does not end up losing it be-
cause of inadequate capitalization by the franchisor. The law further pro-
vides that advertisements may not be placed in magazines without being
filed with the California Corporations Commissioner three days before pub-
lication, and the Commissioner may halt the use of any ad if he finds it to
contain anything false or misleading. If the ad includes only certain spec-
ified information, it need not be registered.
It is worthwhile to note California's legislative solution to the problem
of franchise disclosure because so much of the California experience has
V1 "California Franchise Investment Law," CAL CORP. CODE §§ 31000-31516 (West Supp.
1971).
92 Comnpare the FIL with CAL. CORP. CODE § 25500 (West Supp. 1971).
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heralded developments on the federal level. Unfortunately it does not
appear that in the case of a franchise disclosure act the Congress will
quickly follow California's lead. Neither the 'William's "Franchise Full
Disclosure Act" nor the Stuckey bill seem to be near enactment by Con-
gress. But some type of immediate action is necessary on the federal level
and the SEC could be instrumental in bringing about a quick solution to
the disclosure problem.
First, it is necessary to understand that the SEC cannot simply rede-
fine the term "investment contract" to include all franchise situations.
The definition of investment contract was worked out by courts under
state blue sky laws before Congress incorporated it into the '33 and '34
Acts9" and Congress no doubt intended it to have a meaning quite similar
to the one it had under state law. The courts might permit the Commis-
sion great leeway in redefining the terms by rule, but only within the limits
of the definition intended by Congress. They would not permit a redef-
inition by the Commission to include the "ordinary franchise" contract be-
cause it would stray too far from the Congressional intention.
The SEC might however attempt to redefine investment contract by
rule to include those franchise situations outlined in the 1967 Opinion of
the California Attorney General.94  This would have the effect of alerting
those franchisors who are poorly capitalized or who sell contracts in which
the franchisee plays only a ministerial role that they must register under
the Securities Act of 1933. But as stated above, the Commission's power
to redefine terms in the Act by a rule is open to question.", The general
rule-making power of the Commission is found under § 19(a) of the Se-
curities Act of 1933:
The Commission shall have the authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this title, including rules and regulations governing
registration statements and prospectuses for various classes of securities
and issuers, and defining accounting, technical, and trade terms used in
this subchapter. Among other things, the Commission shall have author-
ity, for the purposes of this subchapter, to prescribe the form or forms in
which required information shall be set forth, the items or details to be
shown in the balance sheet and earning statement .... 90
The language "as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this title"
appears to grant a general power to legislate, but this general language
93 "The term 'investment contract' is undefined by the Securities Act or by relevant legisla-
tive reports. But the term was common in many state 'blue sky' laws in existence prior to the
adoption of the federal statute and, although the term was also undefined by the state laws, It
had been broadly construed by state courts so as to afford the inve2sting public a full measure
of protection." Howey supra, note 33 at 298.
94 Supra note 89.
95 L. Loss, SEctRiTEs REGULATION 942 (1961).
O0 15 U.S.C. § 77s (1970) (emphasis added).
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should be read in the light of the more specific language which follows.
The Commission could redefine investment contract by a rule on the theory
that it was defining a "technical term."
--Although the "risk capital" test for an investment contract was de-
veloped subsequent to congressional enactment of the Securities Acts, the
theory has gained enough judicial acceptance that the courts would prob-
ably accept an administrative redefinition which included the test, and
Venture Investment stands as some evidence of this judicial willingness.
Enactment of a rule would have the force of law in contrast to the mere
issuing of a release. Therefore, the courts could not ignore a Commission-
adopted rule.S7
The "rule-adoption" method would probably be the quickest way to
provide the equivalent of disclosure legislation on the federal level. It
would require no action by Congress with all the attendant delays, and it
would bring a part of the franchise problem under the scrutiny of an agency
which is accustomed to dealing quite effectively with disclosure problems.9s
The SEC also possesses the requisite flexibility to adjust the disclosure re-
quirements to fit the particular security.90
The most glaring problem in this approach is that the California ex-
perience showed that very few franchisees actually registered under the
"limited" approach. Perhaps the highly efficient enforcement policies of
the Commission would result in more registrations. But the California
Commission was also active in the area,lO and there appears to be a danger
that the experience on the federal level might parallel that in California.
The solution to this problem is to bring all franchises within the purview
of a single agency and a single piece of disclosure legislation. In Cali-
fornia, the method chosen to require all franchisors to disclose was to en-
act an entirely new piece of legislation, requiring the Commission in charge
of securities to administer the law.
On the federal level, quick enactment of comprehensive disclosure leg-
islation administered by the SEC is not likely; however, a much simpler
solution would be for Congress to amend the '33 and '34 Acts to bring
every franchise contract within the definition of an "investment contract" 1'0
97 Unless they found that the Commission had strayed too far from the original meaning of
the Act.
98 The Commission could not require all franchisors to register on the theory that it is neces-
sary in order to regulate those which are securities. Section 5(a) says specifically that a registra-
don statement is required for security.
59 L Loss, SEcuRIms REGULATION 216 (1961).
100 The California Corporations Commission accepted the letter of a reputable attorney as
enough to exempt his client from registration. Although this is similar to a no action letter,
such action simply would not be feasible on the national scale.
101 Legislatively, this may be a much simpler solution than enacting an entirely new piece
of legislation. Presumably, the political pressures would be just as strong against this type of
regulation as against the Williams Bill. On the other hand, the SEC at the time hearings
were being held on the matter of proposed franchise disclosure legislation opposed the idea that
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and, consequently, within the disclosure provisions of these Acts. Ad-
mittedly, the franchise contract does not fit the normal conception of a
security in all cases, but creation of the fiction may well be the best way
to get quick action on the franchise disclosure problem.
Normally, those registering under the Securitie,; Act of 1933 must ful-
fill Schedule A requirements. But under § 7, it is provided
that the Commission may by rules or regulations provide that any such
information or document need not be included in respect of any class of is-
suers or securities if it finds that the requirement of such information or
document is inapplicable to such class and that disclosure fully adequate
for the protection of investors is otherwise required to be included within
the registration statement.1 0 2
Since franchises involve special circumstances, certain parts of Schedule
A may be inapplicable. On the other hand, other information more mean-
ingful to a prospective franchisee should be included. In addition, the
Commission should consider enacting rules or regulations describing how
far the information in the registration statement may be summarized or
what may be omitted from the Schedule A requirements in order to permit
the prospectus to be used for purposes of § 5 (b) (1). In other words, the
prospectus mailed to the prospective franchisee need not be as detailed as
the registration statement as long as it does not include "any untrue state-
ment of material fact" or omit "to state any material fact required to be
stated . . . in the light of the circumstances under which such prospectus
is or is to be used.110 3
The disclosure laws recently proposed have used the first four sections
of Schedule A almost verbatim. Thereafter, the authors of the legislation
have departed from Schedule A in order to make the information more
meaningful to franchisees. Many of the requirements of Schedule A could
be modified slightly to accomodate the franchise situation and the pro-
posed disclosure requirements in these new bills could serve as models for
a special registration form. °4
Other proposals for disclosure legislation have been introduced in the
first session of the 92nd Congress. On August 2, 1971, Senator Harrison
Williams, Jr. introduced the "Franchise Fair Practices Act of 19 7 1.1"M
the SEC should be the regulatory body for franchising. Its change in attitude or active en-
couragement of such amendment would have a tremendous effect on Congress,
102 L. Loss, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 216 (1967). "It has been the Commission's policy
from the beginning to adapt the specifications of Schedule A to the circumstances of particular
types of issuers by promulgating a substantial number of separate forms. At present there are
seventeen registration forms." Id. at 216.
103 15 U.S.C. § 77j(b) (1970).
104 See disclosure requirements set out in S. 239, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 and S. 2870, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1971).
105 The "Franchise Fair Practice Act of 1971" supra note 83.
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This bill attempted to provide not only for full disclosure but also for
substantive regulation of various aspects of the franchise agreements by
the FTC under the FTC Act. The bill provides that it "shall constitute an
unfair and deceptive act or practice in commerce under the FTC Act" for
any franchisor to sell or offer a franchise unless a disclosure statement
filed pursuant to other sections of the Act is in effect. Thus, non-disclosure
is redefined as an unfair and deceptive trade practice. It makes it illegal
for the franchisor to use any misrepresentation to obtain money from a
franchisee or "to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business
which operates or would operate as an unfair or deceptive act or practice
with respect to a franchisee." The franchise contract is voidable at the will
Df the franchisee if a valid disclosure statement is not delivered seven days
before the contract or agreement is signed. The bill provides for those
elements which must be included in the disclosure statements and for a
private right of action by anyone damaged by the misleading statements
in a disclosure statement and the damage section authorizes the plaintiff to
receive treble damages. The bill further provides that all other disclosure
or other requirements of state law shall be preempted. A violation under
this act is automatically a violation of the FTC Act. The Commission is
authorized to use all of the rights and remedies with respect to the FTC
Act to enforce this law, including its right to enjoin unfair trade practices.
The "Franchise Fair Disclosure Act of 1971" was introduced into Con-
gress on November 17, 1971 by Senator Hartke.00 This bill is not ma-
terially different from the Williams bill except that it provides that the
FTC has authority to enact one exemption from registration of a disclo-
sure statement. The exemption applies if the franchisor or its parent com-
pany has a net worth of $5,000,000 and if the franchisor has during a five
year period preceding the offering had 25 successful franchisees in opera-
tion or if the franchisor had operated such business successfully for five
years and specified information is given to the franchisee 48 hours prior
to the execution of the contract.
These bills were probably introduced in answer to the opposition of
the SEC to the two former bills which provided for regulation by the
SEC. But the SEC has since modified its position on the question.
The two bills provide for substantially the same disclosure provisions which
could be enacted by rules or regulation under the '33 and '34 Acts. Be-
sides, the FTC is not a body which is as accustomed to handling registra-
tion statements as the SEC and there is no use enacting an entirely separate
piece of legislation to accomplish what could be done by simple amend-
ment of an already comprehensive legislative scheme.
For these reasons, Congress should amend the '33 and '34 Acts imme-
diately to include franchises within the definition of investment contract.
106 Id.
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The Commission should then get the rule-making machinery in operation
to require all franchisors to make the necessary disclosures to prospective
franchisees. Any further delay will cause more and more franchisees to
wonder where franchise disclosure legislation was when they needed it.
Mary Ellen Fairfield
